Showing posts with label Foreign Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Foreign Policy. Show all posts

Sunday, May 22, 2011

Obama screws up Israeli policy w/ controversial and unwelcome comments; Bibi strikes back

Much has transpired over the past few days after Obama stuck foot firmly in mouth by loudly proclaiming that any peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians should be based on the [indefensible] 1967 lines. Not only is this in fact a major change in stated US policy; Obama continues to deny [i.e. lie] that this is in fact a change in policy. Moreover, Israel was completely blindsided on the eve of PM Netanyahu's visit to DC to meet Obama, and both were due to speak days later at the AIPAC conference.

There is much else wrong with what Obama said and how he said it...

Max Boot (may 21) said it very well: "Boy, did President Obama screw up !"

How, you may ask ?

Boy, did President Obama screw up! He gave two-thirds of a great address on Thursday, abandoning his pinched, Realpolitik orientation and promising to put the United States on the side of democrats in the Middle East. It was a ringing call that should have received wide attention, but didn’t. Why not? Because of the final third of his speech, which contained the now-infamous call for a future Israeli-Palestinian peace to be “based on the 1967 lines.”

The president went on to add a caveat to this statement, adding that there would be “mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states.” He also tossed some other rhetorical concessions Israel’s way, for example decrying “antagonism toward Israel,” warning that “efforts to delegitimize Israel will end in failure,” and telling “Palestinian leaders” that they “will not achieve peace or prosperity if Hamas insists on a path of terror and rejection.” He even eschewed his previous call for an Israeli settlement freeze.

None of it mattered. All of the headlines were about Obama becoming the first U.S. president to declare that the 1967 borders—meaning the 1949 cease-fire lines—should be the basis of any peace treaty.

This is a gratuitous insult to our closest ally in the region and an unearned gift to the Palestinians at a time when they are eschewing talks with Israel. It is all the more puzzling because the entire focus of the region has been on the Arab Spring—not on Israel and Palestine. The only people who want to put the focus back on Israel are dictators like Bashar al-Assad who want to deflect popular anger among their own people. Why is Obama playing their game at the same time that he rightly denounces human-rights abuses by Assad, Qaddafi, and their ilk?

And why is he insisting on putting the focus back on the Israeli-Palestinian “peace process” at a time when prospects for a settlement have never been bleaker because of Fatah’s willingness to form a unity government with the genocidal terrorists of Hamas? Obama even agrees with Prime Minister Netanyahu, at least in public, that Israel cannot negotiate with Hamas until that group renounces violence and recognizes Israel’s right to exist—conditions that are likely to be met around the time that cows start jumping over the moon. So, why, then did Obama upend his own pro-democracy speech with a totally unnecessary and counterproductive foray back into the thickets of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking?

I don’t know, but can only conclude that this is a mania that he came into office with, and no amount of hard experience can disabuse him of it.

I commented a few days ago on Obama’s ability to learn from his early blunders on many issues. The fact that he is now taking a harder line with Iran and Syria, while embracing the pro-democracy forces in the region, is evidence of his maturation in office. But when it comes to Israel, Obama just can’t seem to escape his ideological straightjacket. He still seems to believe that an Israeli-Palestinian accord is not only of overarching importance but also something that can be accomplished during his term of office. Many presidents going back to the days of Richard Nixon have fallen prey to the same illusion. In Bill Clinton’s case he was still trying to squeeze out a deal even as his last minutes in office ran out.

I had figured that Obama was smarter than that—that he might have learned from experience. Apparently not.


Below I have included many links addressing what has transpired regarding this completely unnecessary and avoidable mess that Obama made.



Obama's May 22nd speech at AIPAC conference:

http://www.israellycool.com/2011/05/22/barack-obamas-aipac-speech/ video of speech, text of speech & commentary







http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/267784/hamas-attacked-you-mr-president-tevi-troy



Here is what started this whole brouhaha:


Jennifer Rubin in the Washington Post:

That’s when the boos came. It is not “well known” what the deal will be because the right of return, the demand to flood Israel with the children and grandchildren of Arabs who fled during the war of aggression on the infant Jewish state, and the security arrangements are the core of the matter. Moreover, Obama misquoted himself by insisting he said the parties “will negotiate a border that is different than the one that existed on June 4, 1967.” No, he said it was U.S. policy that the deal would stem from the 1967 lines.

He then disingenuously said he’d always meant “it is the right and responsibility of the Israeli government to make the hard choices that are necessary to protect a Jewish and democratic state for which so many generations have sacrifice.” And there was some pablum about the current situation not being sustainable, the U.S. commitment to Israel and Obama’s fondness for the nation whose bargaining position he has undermined.

The problems in the speech include: 1) Obama made it clear the United States is willing to give away Israel’s bargaining position for nothing in return; 2) Obama never even mentioned the right of return; 3) He did not reiterate specifically the necessity of a military presence in the Jordan Valley. You see, only Israel’s expected concessions are “well known”; 4) Israel can’t be expected to negotiate with those who want to destroy it, but negotiations need to resume; and 5) if anything Obama underscored that the United States has differences with Israel — but it’s between “friends.”

Obama must be very certain that liberal Jews will enthusiastically support him no matter what. And there is evidence he is right. Josh Block, senior fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute and a former AIPAC spokesman, e-mailed: “It [the speech] was a strong reaffirmation of the US-Israel relationship, and was an important and positive change from his remarks on Thursday. It reflected an important continuity of US policy going back to President Johnson.”

This is the sort of spin that pro-Israel Democrats use to justify voting for Obama. But there is a reality that can’t be avoided. This president once again has proved an apt negotiator on behalf of the Palestinians and a thorn in Israel’s side. Now is a time of choosing for the American Jewish community, for Israel and for Congress. And if Obama should be reelected in 2012 one can only imagine how hostile he will become toward the Jewish state.

Saturday, April 16, 2011

Libya -- heckuva job Brownie ! (er, Obama, Hilary)

Time to send another strongly worded email ... or fax ... or op-ed ...

Charles Krauthammer On what’s happening in Libya:

It’s not only Senator McCain who said the United States is not doing enough. It’s obvious that our closest allies and the ones who are nearest to the fight on the ground, the British and the French, are saying exactly that. They are complaining, yes, that the Turks and Germans and others aren’t helping. But what they are really talking about is the United States.

You’ve got Qaddafi defying us, going through the street in an open car the way the president of the United States or prime minister of England would not be able to do. He does that in Tripoli supposedly in the middle of a war that we are pretending he is losing. [Meanwhile,] the leaders of the three great countries of the United States, France, and Britain are penning an op-ed. That’s really going to worry Libya.

You’ve got the meeting of the allies and the Arab states in Doha declaring today that the changing of the regime is an objective. And yet there is a stalemate. We are not doing what we can. We are in fact doing far less than we did early in the campaign, and deliberately.

And again I say, if you are going to enter into a war, you are either serious or not. You don’t enter into a war to defend a UN resolution. You enter into a war to achieve a real strategic objective on the ground. If that is not what you will do, stay out of it.


Natonic Implosion?

I think everyone felt some grim, sad irony in watching Qaddafi’s tiny forces hold off a British-French NATO intervention, revealing the once-vaunted rebels to be mostly a Potemkin force — all as the U.S. outsourced its historic leadership role after less than two weeks. But that schadenfreude should have passed long ago, and at some point the U.S. is going to have to decide whether NATO is still a viable organization and worth saving, now that it is on the verge of being utterly humiliated in Libya.

It was always a predominately U.S.-led alliance, but our engagement kept up appearances and seemed at times to provide the Europeans a measure of unity. No longer: The U.S. is detached, the European NATO members are bickering and squabbling, and no one in Washington can explain to them the mission in Libya, the methodology to achieve it, the ultimate results desired, or the extent of NATO commitment in the postwar aftermath. Meanwhile, NATO member Turkey is an open supporter of Hamas and hostile to most of what NATO is for.

We are on the razor’s edge here, and it is not hard to see the alliance disintegrating — all at a time when the traditional supremacy of the dollar is questioned, the financial reputation of the U.S. is still sinking, the traditional use of affordable energy in America seems by intent to be over — and quite abruptly, unless the Obama administration, in its Libyan misadventure, finally decides to take the proverbial Vienna.




Monday, March 28, 2011

After Teleprompter Speech; Obama Still Incoherent on Libya

It took Obama almost 2 weeks to come up with his carefully packaged, and in some instances, blatantly false words. All the imagery of his speech cannot hide the reality of the amateur hour that is his administration.

Here are some good columns:

- Refusing to Lead
- Obama sets Bad precedents
- On Syria, Lose Your Illusions O
- Libya: Just Trust Me Sez O





Obama Still Murky on Libya

President Obama just gave a weird speech. Part George W. Bush, part trademark Obama — filled with his characteristic split-the-difference, straw-man (“some say, others say”), false-choice tropes.

His support for those “yearning for freedom all around the world” was the sort of interventionist foreign policy that a Senator Obama — if his past reaction to the removal of Saddam Hussein is any indication — would have objected to, especially in the case of sending bombers over an Arab Muslim oil-exporting country. Since Saddam was a far greater monster (gassing thousands is far worse than turning off the water to neighborhoods) than the monsters that Obama now wishes to slay, I think he has confused rather than enlightened his audience.

There was no mention of the Congress. Is he going to ever ask its approval? And if not, why the repeated emphasis on asking others such as the Arab League or the UN for their approval — given that their representatives, unlike ours, are largely not elected?

In a speech dedicated to clarifying our policy, it left it even more murky. What was our objective, and what is it now? Obama asserted that “We have stopped his deadly advance.” But is that the aim — the status quo, and a sort of permanent safe zone for rebels in accordance with UN directives? Or are we going beyond that to eliminate Qaddafi, who is the source of the problem? The president now says he won’t overthrow Qaddafi by force, but that is what he hopes, in fact, will happen as a result of our military presence:

Of course, there is no question that Libya — and the world — will be better off with Qaddafi out of power. I, along with many other world leaders, have embraced that goal, and will actively pursue it through non-military means. But broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake.

This is reminiscent of George H.W. Bush’s declaration that he wanted Saddam gone, had used our military to save Kuwait, but not to remove Saddam, urged others to remove him — and then ended up solving one problem while creating another more violent and unending.

Constant reference was made to UN sanctions, in contrast both to the costs incurred in Bush’s Iraq, and the dithering by Clinton in the Balkans. He talked of allies, of joint operations, and a diminished American role to come. But again, to fulfill the UN mandate of saving the Libyans, he is going to have to violate — or at least go beyond — it by going after Qaddafi, a task he now seems to have outsourced to the Europeans, after ceasing the Tomahawk attacks on key Libyan ground installations. Why brag that “we targeted tanks and military assets that had been choking off towns and cities and we cut off much of their source of supply” when we are not going to do it any more, in admission that to do so would be going well beyond a UN-sanctioned no-fly-zone?

Translation: It now seems good to have removed Saddam, but too costly. It was good to remove Milosevic, but it took too long. So I will remove Qaddafi much more quickly and at far less cost, but I won’t do it by targeting Qaddafi, but by preventing his aircraft from flying and hoping Qaddafi goes away. Qaddafi deserves our special intervention because he is worse than other dictators, such as an Assad who is a “reformer” or Ahmadinejad whom we won’t “meddle” against. We successfully sought a UN resolution to protect the people, and will stick by it, but hope somehow someone will go beyond it and remove Qaddafi. We are an exceptional nation that has always acted out of humanitarian concerns in a way not true of other countries (“To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader and — more profoundly — our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different.”), but unfortunately in this case

the United States will play a supporting role — including intelligence, logistical support, search-and-rescue assistance, and capabilities to jam regime communications. Because of this transition to a broader, NATO-based coalition, the risk and cost of this operation — to our military, and to American taxpayers — will be reduced significantly.

Somehow, I don’t think Qaddafi will be impressed enough to step down; the European allies will be somewhat confused over the degree of future American support; the rebels will wonder whether they should take Tripoli or should settle for a zone of sanctuary; critics won’t know whether Obama will ever consult the Congress; we still don’t know why Qaddafi was worse than an Assad or Ahmadinejad — or who or what the rebels are and what the U.S. role will be to ensure something better than Qaddafi.

Other than that, it was yet another well-delivered, split-the-difference, mellifluous Obama speech that said essentially nothing of substance.



Obama on Libya: Look, Just Trust Me On This

Tags: Barack Obama

I’ll have more in tomorrow’s Morning Jolt, but I feel tonight a lot like the night of Obama’s speech announcing the Afghanistan surge to West Point. On paper, I agree with a lot of what Obama is saying. But he’s stringing together a lot of pretty-sounding phrases without really getting at the questions most skeptical Americans have: why intervene here and not in other places? Obama’s caught himself between his comments that clearly suggested regime change (Qaddafimust step down) and a strict adherence to a U.N. mandate that doesn’t include regime change. What is our goal? What do we do when America’s national interest and a United Nations rule conflict? And why are we worrying about what the U.N. says, anyway? Obama seems to be indicating we say publicly that we’re not pursuing regime change military but pursue it through non-military means, which seems like a fine (and perhaps odd) line. (If you’re trying to knock a brutal terror-sponsoring dictator out of power, knock him out of power! Don’t do it halfway!) Finally, what have we signed ourselves on to? Can we trust the Libyan rebels? What are we trying to replace Qaddafi with?

In the end, Obama’s speech amounted to, “Look, I realize none of you understand my decision making, but at the end of the day, you can rest easy knowing I’m right.”

He thinks he’s reassuring us.


NY Post: Refusing To Lead (Libya)

http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/refusing_to_lead_dHJNuHKJFZLIBsnLtTRdzK


Syria: Lose Your Illusions Barack

http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/syria_lose_your_illusions_barack_DsyNsAjkvtbIAmlcYpEGuK


And then of course there is Hillary Clinton, who ran around all weekend saying Syria is different b/c Assad is a "reformer". Oy vey ...





Friday, February 25, 2011

The Emperor's New Clothes

Same as it Ever Was, Same as it Ever was ...


These Are the Days of Obama’s Trepidation.

Tags: Barack Obama

There’s a common theme to the current decisions, or non-decisions, by President Obama.

The wave of unrest sweeping the Middle East holds great promise and great risk for American interests. But setting up a coherent policy to try to steer the unleashed passions in the Arab world and North Africa is hard work with little political reward and enormous potential for high-profile failure. Instead, on the rare occasions that Obama discusses this, he sticks to broad generalities: avoid violence, reflect the people, include all voices. Condolences to the families of those killed and injured. “We’re preparing a range of options.”

The end of Qaddafi’s reign would appear to be beneficial to U.S. interests, but the mad dictator will not go quietly; our ability to influence events is limited and Obama clearly does not want U.S. military forces sucked into another conflict in the Middle East. Instead, Hillary Clinton is sent to Geneva to do . . . . something, apparently.

When the clash in Madison, Wis., began, Obama was quick to weigh in, declaring that he thought the governor’s proposals amounted to “an assault on unions“; within a few days, the White House was insisting that reports of its close coordination with Wisconsin unions and Democrats were overstated and overblown.

The deficit this year is expected to be $1.5 trillion and could go higher; Obama offers only a spending freeze and a budget that even some of his biggest fans are declaring “a profile incowardice.”

Obama spent a great deal of time touting a deficit-control-and-reduction commission and then ignored all of its suggestions.

His spokesman insists that he is still “grappling” with the issue of gay marriage; his administration will not defend the constitutionality of gay marriage, but Obama will not come out and say he believes that gay marriage constitutes a right protected under the Constitution.

The common theme here is President Obama’s trepidation. His critics on the right mocked him for constantly voting “present” before his inauguration. Why does a man vote “present,” barring some legitimate reason like a financial conflict of interest? Because he fears the consequences of voting “yes” or “no.”

Votes, like all decisions, define a person. Obama’s appeal throughout his career has been his ability to resemble a blank slate and let others project their preferences onto him. He stated this explicitly in The Audacity of Hope: “I serve as a blank screen, on which people of vastly different political stripes project their own views.” To decide is to define; to define is to disappoint someone, somewhere. Thus, he sticks to his instinct, to not decide.

At some point, that stops working for a man, and it appears we’ve reached this point. On all of the issues raised above, every path includes risk, public disapproval, hard work, and potential failure. He chooses to not choose — and ends up disappointing just about everyone.

Saturday, February 12, 2011

Egypt, Egypt & more Egypt

Is there nothing else to talk about ?

Please, Egyptian rioters, do not damage the Pyramids. My people are not coming back to rebuild them. Peace Out.

Just Asking

In the midst of all the euphoria (however possibly misplaced) in Egypt, some rude queries:

1) Why were some elements of the American media essentially cheerleading the revolution, as if it were an indisputably good thing? No one has the slightest idea how this is all going to play out, but wasn’t it just a bit unseemly to openly root for an end to an Arab government that has kept the peace with Israel and has been a dependable U.S. ally? Or did the media’s sports-analogy template and need for a narrative climax override its “objectivity”?

2) Why do James Clapper and Leon Panetta still have their jobs? Could their performances yesterday possibly be any more embarrassing? Once again the crack cadres in Langley have been blindsided by events (see: Soviet Union, end of), while the director of national intelligence badly needs to read Andy McCarthy’s The Grand Jihad.

3) Rhetorical bonus question: Is there no penalty for failure in this administration?


Reflections on the Revolution in Egypt

For nearly three weeks, the Biden/Clinton/Obama policy concerning the tottering Mubarak regime was contradictory, incoherent, and predicated entirely on the perceived pulse of the demonstrations. Finally, the confused administration seemed to have realized that U.S. foreign policy must center on long-term support for the non-violent transition to secular consensual government, rather than hour-by-hour, very public assessments of Egyptian individuals. To the degree that individuals thwart constitutionality (quite a different thing from plebiscites), we should be opposed; to the degree they aid it, we should be supportive. That way, we at last dispense with the embarrassments of “Mubarak, a dictator/not a dictator, should/should not/sort of should not go.”

Many other questions are not being asked in the general euphoria over Mubarak’s demise. Why are the more oppressive governments of Syria, Iran, and Libya not subject to the same degree of popular unrest that is said to be surely spreading to Jordan or the Gulf? Is it because for all the authoritarianism of a Mubarak or a Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, there was never the threat of a genocidal Hama, or thousands perishing on the proscription lists under a Khomeini, or international assassinations of dissidents in the Libyan manner? (Would Egyptian-like protests ever have deposed Saddam and his Baathists [cf. the failure in 1991 after the Shiite/Kurdish uprising]?) Does the greater anti-Westernism of a Syria or Iran counterbalance its oppression in the minds of the populace? Much of this reminds me of a Gandhi being fortunate, to paraphrase Orwell, that he was rebelling against the British, and not Germans of the Third Reich.

And does the West invariably keep silent about Iran (cf. spring/summer 2009) because in some strange way, in Western eyes, its virulent anti-Americanism lends a veneer of authenticity, of genuineness, even as we confess that the theocracy has lost popular support — while we assume that Mubarak’s alliance de facto made him more suspect in our eyes? (Would CNN be euphoric at news that the streets of Havana are in uproar?) Is the old Jeane Kirkpatrick Cold War calculus relevant — totalitarian, statist regimes exercise a degree of control that allows them to outlive strongmen and authoritarians?

There are wages to our belated idealism. We all admire America’s current professions of support for human rights — and the apparent end to the reset/realist Obama policies of the last two years — but soon some will ask for consistency. Why do we welcome the demise of a Mubarak, but keep quiet about a Castro or Chávez? Are Cubans freer than Egyptians? Did a Mubarak have more blood on his hands than a Castro? Why celebrate the freedom in the Cairo streets, but help facilitate its growing suppression in Moscow? If we are, admirably, to privilege democracy in the case of Egypt, then surely such ideological tilting must apply to democratic Israel over its autocratic neighbors, or democratic India over autocratic Pakistan, or democratic Colombia over autocratic Venezuela, and so on.

Much has been made of Western social-networking technology, whose entrance in the Arab world has ignited popular outrage over the absence of the elements of civilized life — decent housing, plentiful and safe food and water, effective sewerage, available employment. But how odd that brilliant Western technology — text messaging, Skypeing, iPhones, Google, Facebook — can facilitate the furor over endemic poverty and political oppression, but has so far been unable to materially alleviate the conditions of Middle Eastern poverty — as in novel, inexpensive methods of creating housing, cheaper energy, more plentiful food — that might trump the cultural and political impediments to wealth creation. We can spread Facebook page making to create anger over poverty, but not comparable Western innovations to more directly alleviate poverty.

Few will shed tears for the demise of Hosni Mubarak. But his departure was not the result of an overt reform agenda, a new constitution, or even a group of new visionaries. It was ad hoc furor. So the present coup in Egypt is not the beginning of the end of the revolution, but merely the end of the beginning. Shortly we are going to witness a long period of revolutionary fervor, as small numbers of well-organized zealots, including clerical interests, vie for power. The latter’s ascendance will be marked by disavowals of political ambition, constant organizing for that very purpose, embrace of violence while professing renunciation of violence, and courting of Western interests publicly while privately mobilizing against them.

So let us reflect for a moment on the revolutionary era in Iran to remind us that the end of freedom there was not instantaneous, but insidious. Massive demonstrations broke out against the Shah of Iran in January 1978 — similarly characterized by the prominent role of the middle and upper urbanized and Westernized classes. He was forced to flee Iran almost a year later, on January 16, 1979. The Ayatollah Khomeini arrived in Tehran shortly afterward, on February 1, 1979, disavowing any political ambitions other than “spiritual guidance” — as he was showered with positive appraisals from academics and other “Middle East” experts.

About another year later, on January 25, 1980, Abulhassan Bani-Sadr was elected president of Iran by an overwhelming margin — to expressions of joy that a sort of European-like socialist republic had replaced the Shah’s crass cowboy westernization. He ruled for a little more than a year and a half, then fled for his life from Iran on July 28, 1981 — his reign characterized by pitiful demonstrations of anti-Americanism designed to curry favor with the murderous Islamists. The entire revolutionary period between January 1978 and July 1981 was characterized by two general developments: repeated assurances from the Ayatollah Khomeini that there would not be a theocratic government, and insidious, constant erosion of secular government by Khomeini’s clerical followers.

In other words, when the crowds go home and return to their jobs, the most zealous, organized, and ruthless will go to work to consolidate power. Let us hope for the best — a secular, pro-Western constitutional republic backed by a professional military — and prepare for the worst — two to three years of revolutionary fervor as Islamists, month by month, gain control of the Arab world’s largest state after coming to power by one man, one vote, one time.

— Victor Davis Hanson is a classicist and historian at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and the author, most recently, of The Father of Us All: War and History, Ancient and Modern.


In Uncertain Egypt, a Few Certainties

On its first day without Hosni Mubarak, Egypt is full of uncertainties. However, let us deal with the certainties. The first is that the uprising against Mubarak brought together Egyptians from all walks of life and from all political and religious affinities. This was a genuinely popular and, at least in its first stages, spontaneous uprising inspired by what had happened in Tunisia, with its “Jasmine Revolution.”

This means a possible reversal of the historic pattern in which political and cultural trends originate in the eastern part of the “Arab world,” with Egypt as the center. This time, the trend came from Tunisia in the west, with its remarkable mix of Arab and European sensibilities.

However, it is clear to me that change in Tunisia was ultimately imposed by the army. In Egypt, on the other hand, the army tried to prop up Mubarak until the last minute. It was the popular uprising that forced Mubarak out. This means that we have just witnessed a genuinely historic moment: the first time an Arab despot has been forced out by a mass movement.

The second certainty is that the Obama administration discredited itself by praising Mubarak to the skies before trying to dictate his departure. That sorry exercise revealed the weakness of the United States while casting it as a fickle friend that might stab you in the back.

The third certainty is that radical anti-democratic forces are already preparing to ambush the new Egypt. The first move in that direction came from Syria last night when its official television station announced “the end of the Camp David peace” with Israel and urged the adoption of a new strategy to “face the Zionist foe.” Iran, though shaken by an Egyptian uprising that echoed its own pro-democracy movement in 2009, is developing a similar theme.

Amir Taheri is the author of The Persian Night: Iran under the Khomeinist Revolution.


What Are Iran’s Plans Now that Mubarak Is Out? What Are Ours?

Berlin — Today marks the 32nd anniversary of Khomeini’s Islamic revolution in Iran, just as the Iranian regime, while falsely claiming to support Egyptians’ right to assemble and protest,employs heavy-handed tactics to suppress demonstrations in Tehran. The failure of the West to energetically confront Iran’s bellicose policies might very well be revealed in the post-Mubarak era.

Iran’s understanding of a new Egyptian political system mirrors the fiercely anti-democratic goals of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. That helps to explain why a top Brotherhood official, Kamal al-Halbavi, says he seeks “a good government, like the Iranian government, and a good president like Mr. Ahmadinejad, who is very brave.”

If the West, particularly the Obama administration, is serious about the business of democracy-promotion in Egypt and in the Muslim world, then an accelerated round of hard-hitting sanctions ought to be implemented against Iran’s energy sector. Iran’s authoritarian regime, like those of many Arab countries, is economically fragile; the key is to turn the sanctions screws on imports of Iranian crude oil to India, Italy, and China. Crude-oil sanctions targeting Iran serve the twin goals of advancing democracy in Egypt and perhaps contributing to the demise of the Iranian regime.

Moreover, EU countries should follow the example of the Netherlands, which this past week recalled its ambassador to protest the Iranian regime’s wretched human-rights record — the first EU country to do so. A 45-year-old Dutch-Iranian woman named Zahra Bahrami was hanged last month, an execution termed by Dutch foreign minister Uri Rosenthal a “shocking act of a barbaric regime.” Bahrami’s “crime”? To replicate what Egyptian protestors are doing — namely, to demonstrate for more democracy. She participated in the 2009 demonstrations against the fraudulent election of Ahmadinejad. Iran’s judiciary framed her, alleging she smuggled narcotics.

In short, democratic change in Egypt is arguably contingent on blocking the spread of revolutionary Iranian Islam in the Middle East.

Benjamin Weinthal is a fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Saturday, January 29, 2011

Gibbs last day: Pilloried by Denninger for idiocy

A guest appearance: The title of this blog post is priceless !



Gibbs: You Listening To Yourself, Jackass?

Gibbs: All governments around the world have to be responsive to the people they serve.

Uh huh.

Like the statement Barack made that he didn't come to Washington to serve the banks?

Like TARP, passed over 100:1 objections of The American People?

Like Obamacare, passed over monstrous objections of The American People?

Like running $1.7 trillion in deficits last year, and over $4.5 trillion in the last three years, with no plan to solve the problem or even slow it down? Remember, the CBO just updated their projections, after your bossadded $500 billion more to the deficit for this year.

Like false claims - lies - on virtually every single political claim made during his campaign?

Like refusal to insist on prosecution of those who filed false affidavits - 150,000 cases of perjury?

Like refusal to insist on indicting Bernanke for perjury before Congress, when he said he wouldn't monetize the debt?

Like refusal to insist on indicting the banksters that caused this collapse in the first place, even though we have sworn testimony of intentional deception, such as the Citibank bad loans that were made and sold off?

Like refusal to deal with the fact that if we cut to zero every Federal Program other than Medicare, Social Security, Medicaid, Unemployment and Welfare, we would still be running a deficit after you paid the interest on the debt? That is, you can't even balance the budget today if you not only cut the Pentagon to zero but you also cut everything else to zero, including the budget for the guy who sweeps your carpet in the Oval Orifice, and this is ENTIRELY your responsibility.

There's no inflation here, right? That's why cotton is up 300% in the last two years, wheat has nearly doubled, oil is trading near $90, oats have more than doubled, soybeans have nearly doubled... all but cotton in the last year?

Responsive to the people Mr. Gibbs? Really?

What happens when Egypt comes here Mr. Gibbs? What happens when the budgetary reality becomes realized risk? What happens when the market collapses because all of this speculation that you have not only encouraged but have driven through policy turns into a 90% stock market collapse and the literal cessation of trucks on the highway and food on the shelves?

Does it have to happen here, Mr. Gibbs, before the government becomes responsive to the people?

The people have spoken.

Repeatedly.

You and President Obama have refused to listen and to act in accordance with those wishes.

Your boss, Mr. Obama, continues to insist that he knows much better than people do, as do you.

Remember Mr. Gibbs: responsive to the people.

That's your standard.

What are you going to do if the Suez canal is closed over the weekend and oil gaps up to $100, $125, $150 or more?

Your Boss, Mr. Gibbs, and our President, is directly responsible for the food and energy inflation that the world has had to absorb. We have intentionally abused our status as having the world's reserve currencyand have debased that currency by monetizing debt - an act that Ben Bernanke said he would not do, under oath, before Congress.

YOUR BOSS reappointed him to his office.

This was 20 years coming, but you could have stopped it in 2009. You could have taken every one of these institutions into receivership and closed them. You still can.

Instead, you have been and still are performing fellatio on those very same bankers.

Daily.

President Obama is directly responsible for what is happening today. He has literally caused people to starve, and now to die.

Let me repeat that: President Obama is directly responsible for what is happening Mr. Gibbs.

He will be held politically responsible, and so will everyone on The Hill who has refused and continues to refuse to act on these issues.

You're overdue on being responsive to the people Mr. Gibbs, and so is Mr. Obama.


Tuesday, November 23, 2010

North Korea attacks South - direct consequence of Obama's failed policies

North Korea and the Ripple Effects of Obama’s Foreign Policy

The North Koreans are sending another loud reminder that they are crazy and unpredictable. They just finished showing off another nuclear facility, which means they want more appeasement money to sorta-kinda monitor it under “international” auspices. This shake-down gambit seems to be the paradigm of the future, an easy way to gain cash, attention, and influence otherwise not accorded such a miserable state. Note that in such cases (cf. Iran), the Chinese are usually in the vicinity.

Nonetheless, the more sinister regions of the world are watching the U.S. response to the shelling, for either a yellow or a green light for their own agendas. More enlightened states are watching, too, for indications of the American reaction should the trouble spread to their corners of the world.

But after 22 months of apologizing, bowing, and contextualizing supposed American sins from the trivial (lamenting the Arizona law in a meeting with the Chinese) to the profound (the mythical Cairo speech, unilaterally pressing Israel right out of the starting gate), the Obama administration has sent the message that it may not be so comfortable with America’s past unilateral responsibilities to its allies, and may even sympathize with some of the grievances of our purported enemies. Whether this assessment is fair or not, that’s the message they’ve sent.

Dismissing the idea that past global problems might transcend George W. Bush, this administration operated as if a charismatic world citizen, with reset magic, could win over the globe to a U.N.-sponsored utopia. These false assumptions intrigued the curious abroad — why would Obama seek to advance such absurd notions about global problems having originated with U.S. belligerence circa 2001–2009 and being resolved by U.S. empathy in 2009–2010? Apparently, as we are now learning, North Korea wants to find out the answer.

In general, listlessness and misdirection in Washington always ripple out to the world abroad within a year or two. Sanctimonious Carterism had confirmed the image of a paralytic America by 1979, which may be why that year saw the Chinese in Vietnam, the Russians in Afghanistan, Communists on the rise in Central America, hostages in Tehran, the end of the Shah, and the rise of an emboldened radical Islam. When Nixon and his congressional opponents wrecked U.S. foreign policy in the long dark days of Watergate, by 1973-4 the world became a very unstable place, with the Yom Kippur War, oil embargoes, an imploding Southeast Asia, and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

The tragedy of all this is that, once a sense of American self-confidence is lost, the result is usually a lot of post facto, herky-jerky catch-up efforts to restore credibility. E.g., a once-sermonizing Carter suddenly boycotting the Olympics and establishing the Carter doctrine in the Middle East, or the U.S. 1973 global alert during the Yom Kippur War, or Gerald Ford and the 1975 Mayaguez incident.

To deter North Korea, we should now express and follow through on the sort of solidarity that is unquestioned, a kind of solidarity that has been sorely lacking in the last two years with Israel, Britain, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

And, in a larger sense, the commander-in-chief needs to stop his contextualizing and apologizing, especially this pernicious messianic notion that, as an empathetic and post-national president, his mission is to redeem a previously culpable America. Otherwise, in the next two years that nonsense is going to get people killed.



Krauthammer’s Take

From Monday night’s Fox News All-Stars.

On the revelation that North Korea has an advanced uranium enrichment facility:

I think this is the final demonstration of the uselessness and the futility of our negotiations with Pyongyang. The farce began 16 years ago when the Clinton administration concluded what was called the framework agreement in which the deal was they would freeze and then dismantle their plutonium program in return for all kinds of goodies, including two nuclear reactors that we would construct, and a lot of, a lot of economic support.

The problem is that there are two ways you can develop a bomb, plutonium or uranium. We assumed all they had was plutonium. Then in 2002, our negotiator in Pyongyang was told that they had a separate uranium program. They then denied it over and over again after that one instance. So we had no idea.

And now we discover they have, as you said, an advanced facility, thousands of these machines that look quite modern. This is not something that was done overnight. So they had a parallel program while they pretended under the Clinton and the Bush administrations to be dismantling or at least holding back on the plutonium program, which means they were not stopping at all on their development of nukes.

I think we will reflexively return to negotiations. The reason all this is revealed is because what they want is another farcical deal in which this program is supposedly restrained in return for a lot of economic aid. Their economy is worse off than it ever was and they are now in a succession crisis.

The problem is everything they say, everything they sign is not worth the paper it’s written on. …

I think we have to completely redirect the policy. It’s not to aim at the leadership in [North] Korea. It’s to aim at the leadership in China. We heard earlier in the show that the Pentagon is considering a request by the South Koreans for tactical American nuclear weapons … We ought to go one step beyond that, to offer South Korea its own nuclear program and to encourage the Japanese to arm themselves if they need to. The way to say it is: All our [Six-Party] negotiations including China — with China — have not succeeded. You’re going to have to arm yourselves and develop a deterrent.

That will get the attention of the Chinese. Up until now the Chinese have played a double game. They have no interest in helping us on the [North Korea] issue. They like having it as a thorn in our side. It’s distracting us as China expands its influence in all of Asia.

What we ought to say is: What they’re worried about is a Japan with nukes or a South Korea with nukes. Let them [the Chinese] imagine that will be the outcome of this double game — and they will begin to act. They control what happens in Pyongyang. All the fuel, all the food comes through China and they could turn it off.